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Commonwealth v. Smith
557 S.E.2d 223 (Va. 2002)
I. Facts
On November 20,1994, TunothyFrazier ("Frazier') and appellant, Melvin
Smith ("Smith"), went to a store in Richmond intending to kill Tyrone Reed
("Reed"). The killing was meant to be in retaliation for the earlier murder of
appellant's friend, Michael Atkins. Frazier and Smith began frng their guns
when they reached the store, killing two bystanders, Bruce Ross ("Ross") and
Irvin Doughty ("Doughty"). Four months later, Smith told Frazier that he had
shot and killed Kenneth "Randy" Smith ("Randy"). At trial, Smith testified that
he killed Randy in self-defense.' On August 19, 1996, over one year after
Randy's murder, Smith told Frazier that he had shot and killed Warrick Ray
("Ray") in a rooming house in Richmond2
The Commonwealth charged Smith with first degree murder for the killing
of Ross and capital murder for the killing of Doughtyin the sane transaction as
the killing of Ross? It also charged Smith with first degree murder for the killing
of Randyand capital murder for the killing of Raywithin three years of the killing
of "Irving Doughty and/or Bruce Ross and/or Kenneth 'Randy Smith." The
Commonwealth also charged Smith with four counts of use of a firearm in the
commission of murder. The trial court denied Smith's motion to sever the
charges, and all of the charges were submitted to the same jury. On September
24, 1999, a juryfound Smith not guiltyof the murders of Ross and Doughty, and
not guilty of the related firearm charges. The jury found Smith guilty of the
murder of Randy, the court declared a mistrial as to the murder of Ray and the
related firearm charge because the jury deadlocked on those charges. Smith
appealed his conviction for the murder of Randy, contending that the trial judge
committed reversible error in denying Smith's motion to sever the murder
charges. The Court of Appeals of Virginia held that the joinder of the four
1. Smith v. Commonwealth, 557 SE2d 223, 225 (Va. 2002) (Smith testified that he killed
Randywhen Randy reached for a gun, because he "thought Randywas being paid to kill" himi.).
2. Id
3. Seaso VA. OODE ANN. S 18.2-31(7) (Mlchie Supp. 2001) (defining capital murder as
"[the willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of more than one person as a part of the sane act
or transaction").
4. See also VA. CODE ANN. 5 182-31(8) chieupp. 2001) (defining capital murder as




murder charges was improper and reversed Smith's convictions for the murder
of Randy and the related firearm charge.'
I. Hddr
The Supreme Court of Virginia, finding that the trial court properly denied
Smith's motion for separate trials, reversed the holding of the court of appeals."
The supreme court reinstated the judgment of the trial court and remanded the
case for enforcement of the sentencing order.7
Iff. A rmlbss A pplinon in Vi~w
The Supreme Court of Virginia stated that "the sole question for decision.
is whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for separate
trials. "' The court relied on Obevv C*e wx r to establish that it must give
considerable deference to the trial court's ruling on whether the different of-
fenses should have been tried separately." Under this standard of review, the
court found that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying Smith's
motion to sever the charges of the four murders."
In order to fulfill the joinder requirements of Rule 3A.6(b),"2 the Common-
wealth sought to prove that the four murders were part of a "common scheme
or plan."' 3 The Commonwealth maintained that the charges were joined prop-
erly because the motive for the murders was drug and gang-related."4 Smith
asserted that joinder was improper because the four murders were not connected
by"a common scheme or plan," as required byRule 3A.6(b). To define the term
"connected," as used in Rule 3A.6(b), Smith turned to Kikpatri v Crnv
'uazlth.'5 In Kkpa&, the court held that two crimes maybe joined when there
is such an "intimacy and connection" between them that they make up a chain
of events that should not be broken." Smith argued that the court of appeals
5. Snith, 557 S.E2d at 224-27.
6. Id at 227.
7. Id
8. Id at 225.
9. 393 S.E2d 599 (1990).
10. Cleng v. Commonwealth, 393 SIE.d 599,603 (Va. 1990) (stating that the decision of
whether to grant a defendant's motion to sever charges is within the trial cour's discretion, and may
not be disturbed unless this discretion was abused).
11. Srni, 557 SX.E2d at 227.
12. VA.SuP. Cr. R. 3A:6 (stating that "(tlwo or more offenses... maybe charged in separate
counts of an indictment... if the offenses are based on the same act or transaction, or on two or
more acts or transactions that are connected or constitute pars of a common scheme or plan").
13. Snizh, 557 S.E.2d at 225.
14. Id
15. Id; se Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 176 S.E.2d 802 (Va. 1970).
16. k&rkpa, i, 176 S.E.2d at 807.
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correctly found that there was no evidence that the murders were gang-related
or that he was involved in a drug ring.17 Thus, he asserted, his crimes were not
"connected."t1
The Supreme Court of Virginiarejected Smith's argument and dismissedthe
issue of Smith's possible involvement in a gang or drug trade as "irrelevant." 9
Instead, the supreme court accepted the Commonwealth's position and based its
analysis on the language of Virginia Code Section 18.2-31(8) itself.2" The Corn-
monwealth stated that in order for a murder to be classified as capital murder,
there must be an aggravating circumstance as required in the various subsections
of Virginia Code Section 182-31.. Here, the Commonwealth asserted, the
required aggravating circumstance was the gradation crime of Smith's killing of
more than one person within a three-year period.2' The supreme court held that
this gradation murder provided the necessary "connection" to make joinder of
Smith's charges permissible.23 The court stated that "'gradation' equates with
'connection,"' and thus, the joinder requirements of Rule 3A.10 were met.24 In
so holding, the court stated that its previous definition of "connected crimes,"
as stated in Kicpatrid, no longer applies.25 The court held that Rule 3A-10(c) no
longer requires a factual connection between the different offenses; but rather,
for the purposes of Virginia Code Section 18.2-31(8), it requires the connection
of the principal and gradation murders occurring within a three-year period.26
The Supreme Court of Virginia stated that the court of appeals incorrectly
assumed that the analysis followed bythe supreme court would take the place of
the joinder test.27 Instead, the court declared that its analysis still made use of the
joinder test, but that the General Assembly had acted within its authority by
modifying the joinder rule.28 The court cited Virginia Code Section 8.01-3(D),
which states that "[t]he General Assembly may, from time to time, bythe enact-
ment of a general law, modify, or annul any rules adopted or amended [by this
Court]."" The court found that the General Assemblyimplicitly modified Rule
17. Snit, 557 S.E.2d at 225.
18. Id
19. Id




24. Id; se also VA. SUP. Cr. R. 3A.10(c) (staing that "[t]he court maydirect that an accused
be tried at one time for all offenses then pending against him, if justice does not require separate
trials and... the offenses meet the requirements of Rule 3A.6(b)").




29. Id; salso VA.GDE ANN. S 8.01-3(D) (lchie 2000) (stating that "[in the case of any
variance between a rule and anenactnment of the General Assemblysuch variance shall be construed
2002]
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3A.6(b) for the purposes of Virginia Code Section 18.2-31(8) by no longer
requiring the Commonwealth to establish an intimate factual connection between
the crimes in order to permit joinder." Thus, if the princijal murder and the
gradation murder were committed within three years of each other, they will be
deemed to be "connected," satisfying the requirement of Rule 3A.6(b).1' Accord-
ing to the court's holding, Rule 3A.10 still triggers Rule 3A.6(b), but if the two
murders were committed within a three-year period, Rule 3A.6(b)'s requirement
that the two acts must be "connected" is met per se by the gradation offense.
Even before the court's holding in Snit,, the Commonwealth's charge of
a capital murder under Virginia Code Section 18.2-31(8) would read: "Count 1
- the killing of A within 3 years of the killing of B." There is no joinder question
in the preceding count. What is at stake in Sinith is the joinder of the first degree
murder of B in the same indictment as the capital murder of A. After Snih, the
Commonwealth may charge a defendant as follows: "Count 1- the killing of A
within 3 years of the killing of B. Count 2 - the first degree murder of B."
Joinder of the first degree gradation murder has always been permissible
when the capital murder is charged under Virginia Code Section 18.2-31(7).
Virginia Code Section 18.2-31(7) requires the two offenses charged to be com-
mitted in the "same act or transaction." This requirement is narrower than that
of Rule 3A.6(b), which requires onlythat the two offenses be part of a "common
scheme or plan." Because proper joinder under Rule 3A.6(b) will always be
present in such cases, Rule 3A.10(c) will permit the counts to be simultaneously
tried "if justice does not require separate trials."32 Because the capital murder and
first degree murder are necessarily alleged to be part of the same transaction, it
is extremely unlikely that the defendant will be able to show that he will be
prejudiced bythe trial on the joined events-i.e., the defendant will not be able to
show that justice requires separate trials.
The same is not true of cases charged under Virginia Code Section 18.2-
31(8). In those cases, after Snith, the capital murder and first degree murder
counts are joinable under Rule 3A.6(b) because theyare "connected."33 Because
this "connection" satisfies Rule 3A. 10(c), the counts maybe tried together "if
justice does not require separate trials." 34 The two killings mayhave no relation-
ship to each other except the three-year time span. Thus, it is far more likelythat
trying the capital murder and first degree murder together will prejudice the
defendant-i-e., justice will require separate trials.
so as to give effect to such enactment").
30. Snr , 557 S.E2d at 226.
31. Id
32. VA. SUP. Cr. R. 3A.10(c).
33. VA. SUP. Cr. K, 3A.0(b).
34. VA. SLP. Cr. K 3A.10(c).
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Smith did not specificallyrelyon Rule 3A 10(c) to argue that justice requiredseparate trials. s Although Smith did argue that joining the four murders before
the jury would be prejudicial, he asserted that this prejudice would be "violative
of due process."' The court rejected this argument and found that it had acted
within its scope of authority in setting a "precise condition" that the murders
must have been committed within a three-year period in order to be joined under
Virginia Code Section 18.2-31(8), "despite the prejudice that mayresuk thereaf-
ter.""7 It is unclear whether the court would have accepted Smith's assertion of
unfair prejudice if the argument had been made pursuant to Rule 3A.10(c)11
Showing that the prejudice caused byjoinder violated Smith's due process rights
is more difficult than showing that this prejudice violated the requirement of
justice under Rule 3A:10(c). Thus, it is possible that Smith might have been
successful in arguing under Rule 3A.10(c) that unfair prejudice should have
precluded joinder.
IV. Exr ie
Alex killed his wife to collect from her life insurance. Eight months later,
Alex killed his girlfriend because he discovered that she was having an affair. The
Commonwealth charges Alex with first-degree murder under Viginia Code
Section 182-32 for the murder of his girlfriend." In the same indictment the
Commonwealth seeks to charge Alex with capital murder for the murder of his
wife within three years of the murder of his girlfriend under Virginia Code
Section 18.2-31(8).' Before the Supreme Court of Virginia's holding in Snith,
the Commonwealth would not have been permitted to join the two murders
because theywere not part of the same act or transaction. However, applying the
rule in Smitb, the indictment charging the first degree murder of the girlfriend can
now be joined, because the Rule 3A.6 requirement of "connection" is satisfied.
Rule 3A.10(c) may, however, still require separate trials.
Mytr A. Jayaman
35. Snitb, 557 S.E2d at 225 n.2.
36. Id
37. Id at 227.
38. S&VA. SLP. Cr. R. 3A.10(c).
39. VA. ODE ANN. 5 182-32 (Micie Supp. 2001).
40. VA. GODE ANN. 5 18.2-31(8) (Michie Supp. 2001).
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